The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed as moot an appeal filed by the Department for Children and Families in a case involving eligibility for the state's General Assistance Emergency Housing Program. The decision, issued in *In re Appeal of H.D.* (2025 VT 67), centered on how the department calculates the 80-day emergency housing benefit period under Vermont's fiscal year 2026 appropriations act.
The case involved H.D.'s household eligibility for Vermont's General Assistance Emergency Housing Program as of July 1, 2025. The program provides 80 days of emergency housing assistance to qualifying households. The central dispute concerned whether days that H.D. received prior to the start of fiscal year 2026 should count toward the 80-day limit.
The Department for Children and Families had considered days that H.D. received before fiscal year 2026 began when concluding that H.D. had exceeded the 80-day limit and was therefore ineligible for continued benefits. This interpretation would have denied H.D.'s household access to the emergency housing program.
H.D. challenged the department's determination, appealing the decision to the Vermont Human Services Board. The board reversed the department's decision after examining the language of the "Big Bill" Fiscal Year 2026 Appropriations Act, 2025, No. 27, § E.321(b)(2), commonly referred to as "Act 27."
The Human Services Board concluded that under the plain language of Act 27, only the days that H.D. received during fiscal year 2026 should count toward the 80-day limit. The board interpreted the statutory language to reset the counting period with the new fiscal year, effectively giving H.D. a fresh start for the 80-day calculation. Based on this interpretation, the board held that H.D. was eligible for the program at the time of her application.
Dissatisfied with the board's reversal, the Department for Children and Families appealed the decision to the Vermont Supreme Court. The department sought to reinstate its original determination that would have counted pre-fiscal year 2026 days toward H.D.'s 80-day limit.
However, the Vermont Supreme Court never reached the merits of the dispute over statutory interpretation. Instead, the court dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the issues presented were no longer live controversies requiring judicial resolution.
H.D. had argued to the court that the case was moot because the parties no longer had a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The court agreed with this assessment, applying established precedent regarding mootness doctrine.
Under Vermont law, a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Courts generally will not decide cases that have become moot because judicial resources should be focused on disputes that can result in meaningful relief for the parties involved.
The dismissal means that the Human Services Board's interpretation of Act 27 stands, at least in H.D.'s case. The board's reading of the statute suggests that the 80-day emergency housing benefit period resets with each fiscal year, rather than carrying over days from previous periods.
This interpretation could have broader implications for how the Department for Children and Families administers the General Assistance Emergency Housing Program going forward. Other households in similar situations may benefit from the board's interpretation that only days received during the current fiscal year count toward the 80-day limit.
The case was handled by Vermont Legal Aid, with Staff Attorney Maryellen Griffin representing H.D. before the court. Vermont Attorney General Charity R. Clark and Assistant Attorney General Timothy P. Connors represented the Department for Children and Families in the appeal.
Chief Justice Paul L. Reiber wrote the brief opinion dismissing the appeal. The decision was joined by Justices William D. Cohen, Nancy J. Waples, and Harold E. Eaton, along with Superior Judge Dennis Treadwell, who was specially assigned to the case.
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision leaves unresolved the broader question of how Act 27 should be interpreted in future cases involving the General Assistance Emergency Housing Program. While H.D.'s case resulted in a favorable outcome through the Human Services Board's decision, other households may face similar disputes with the Department for Children and Families over benefit calculations.
The emergency housing program serves as a critical safety net for Vermont households facing housing instability. The 80-day limit is designed to provide temporary assistance while households work toward more permanent housing solutions. How those days are calculated can determine whether families maintain access to this vital program or face potential homelessness.
The mootness dismissal means that future cases involving similar statutory interpretation questions will need to be resolved on their individual merits, either through the administrative process or potential future appeals that present live controversies requiring judicial resolution.