The Texas Supreme Court reversed a lower court's termination of parental rights in a case where the state agency's own representative contradicted the relief being sought at trial. In *D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services* (Tex. 2025), the court held that trial courts cannot terminate parental rights when the Department of Family and Protective Services makes unequivocal statements withdrawing termination as requested relief.
Justice Young delivered the opinion for the court in case No. 24-0840, which was argued on Sept. 11, 2025. The decision addresses a fundamental question about the limits of judicial authority in parental termination cases when the state agency itself indicates it does not seek the most extreme remedy available.
The case centers on D.V., referred to as Mother in the opinion, who has a documented history of violent behavior and drug use. The department initially took custody of her child E.D. after Mother reportedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other two children. The agency filed a petition seeking to terminate both Mother's and Father's parental rights.
However, the department's position evolved significantly by the time of trial. The agency apparently changed its stance regarding the father, who became the department's preferred choice to serve as E.D.'s permanent sole managing conservator, effectively granting him exclusive parental authority. Despite this shift, the department's formal pleading still demanded termination for both parents when the case went to trial.
The critical issue arose from statements made by the department's designated representative during the trial proceedings. This representative twice explicitly told the court that the department sought to restrict, rather than terminate, Mother's parental rights. The department never repudiated this position or affirmatively informed the court that it still sought termination despite these statements.
Despite the department representative's clear statements, the trial court proceeded to render judgment terminating Mother's parental rights. The court noted that no one regarded the formal demand for termination in the pleadings as representing the department's actual position at trial.
Mother appealed the termination decision, but the department defended the judgment and argued it had not abandoned its request for termination. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court's decision, setting the stage for the Supreme Court review.
The Texas Supreme Court's reversal establishes an important principle limiting judicial authority in parental termination cases. The court held that when someone speaking on the department's behalf makes an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement withdrawing termination as requested relief, courts may not proceed with termination.
This ruling addresses the tension between formal pleadings and actual positions taken by state agencies during trial proceedings. The court emphasized that the department's representative's statements carried significant weight, particularly when made twice without subsequent correction or clarification.
The decision reflects the courts' recognition of the extraordinary nature of parental rights termination, which represents the complete and permanent severing of the parent-child relationship. Such proceedings are among the most serious in family law, requiring clear evidence and unambiguous positions from all parties, including the state agency seeking relief.
The case also highlights the evolving nature of child protective proceedings, where initial positions may change as circumstances develop and new information emerges. The department's shift from seeking termination of both parents' rights to supporting Father as sole managing conservator illustrates how these cases can evolve significantly between filing and trial.
Justice Hawkins did not participate in the decision, though the opinion does not specify the reason for the recusal.
The ruling provides important guidance for trial courts handling parental termination cases, establishing that they must pay careful attention to the actual positions articulated by department representatives during proceedings, rather than relying solely on formal pleadings that may no longer reflect the agency's current stance.
This decision also impacts how the Department of Family and Protective Services approaches these cases, emphasizing the need for clear communication between legal representatives and the courts about the relief actually being sought.
The case represents a victory for parental rights advocates who argue that termination should only occur when clearly sought by the state agency and supported by evidence. The decision ensures that procedural clarity accompanies one of the most consequential determinations in family law.
Moving forward, the ruling will likely require both trial courts and state agencies to maintain greater coordination between formal pleadings and actual trial positions, ensuring that the most serious remedy in family law is only pursued when genuinely sought by all relevant parties.