The Texas Supreme Court declined to review *City of Houston v. Ashley Harris* (Tex. 2025), leaving unresolved a circuit split that has created uncertainty for trial courts across the Houston region regarding the evidentiary value of superseded admissions in summary judgment proceedings.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Devine, Justice Young acknowledged the need for future clarity on whether a party's original admission retains evidentiary value after being superseded by an amended admission. The question, as framed by Justice Young, is whether "the very act of amending one's statement on a material issue create[s] a genuine dispute of material fact."
The case arose from a collision between a Houston police officer and Ashley Harris. The officer was driving an unmarked, city-owned truck while heading to work when the accident occurred. Harris subsequently sued the City of Houston for damages under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
During discovery, the City initially admitted in response to Harris's requests for admission that the officer had been acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. However, after conducting additional discovery and obtaining the trial court's permission, the City amended its response to deny that the officer was acting within the scope of employment.
The City then moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from Harris's claims because the officer had acted outside the scope of his employment. The trial court denied the motion, and the City appealed.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. The appeals court reasoned that "even though superseded admissions cease to be conclusive judicial admissions, they are still evidence," and that this "evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the officer] was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident."
This holding by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals stands in contrast to decisions by other Houston-area courts of appeals, creating what Justice Young described as a split that "places that region's trial courts in quite a bind." The competing interpretations leave trial judges uncertain about how to treat superseded admissions when ruling on summary judgment motions.
The legal question centers on the fundamental nature of amended admissions in civil procedure. Under traditional rules, a party's admission is considered a conclusive judicial admission that cannot be contradicted at trial. However, courts generally allow parties to amend their admissions with permission, particularly when new information emerges during discovery.
The dispute arises over what happens to the original admission once it has been superseded. One line of authority, represented by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in this case, treats the superseded admission as retaining some evidentiary value that can create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The opposing view would treat superseded admissions as having no evidentiary value once properly amended.
Justice Young expressed doubt about whether superseded admissions should constitute evidence that precludes summary judgment, writing "I doubt it." However, he emphasized that the Supreme Court "will need to answer the question at some point" given the conflicting authorities.
While agreeing with the Court's decision to deny review in this particular case, Justice Young explained that the case was "not the right one" to resolve the issue. He wrote separately "to call attention to the issue so that, in a proper case, this Court's review might be facilitated."
The procedural uncertainty created by the circuit split has practical implications for litigation strategy and case management. Attorneys representing municipalities and other defendants may be reluctant to amend admissions if doing so could create rather than eliminate factual disputes. Conversely, plaintiffs may view initial admissions as creating litigation advantages that persist even after amendment.
The split also affects how trial courts approach discovery management and summary judgment practice. Judges must navigate conflicting precedents when determining whether superseded admissions create genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary disposition.
The case highlights broader questions about the balance between allowing parties flexibility to correct admissions as discovery progresses while maintaining the integrity of the judicial admission process. Courts must weigh the policy of encouraging accurate admissions against the potential for strategic manipulation of the discovery process.
The Texas Supreme Court's decision to deny review means the circuit split will continue until a future case presents the issue in a procedural posture more suitable for resolution. Justice Young's concurrence suggests the Court is aware of the need for clarification and may be more receptive to reviewing the issue in an appropriate case.
Until the Supreme Court provides guidance, Houston-area trial courts will continue operating under conflicting precedents, with the treatment of superseded admissions potentially varying depending on which appellate district ultimately reviews their decisions. The uncertainty underscores the importance of clear procedural rules governing the amendment of party admissions and their subsequent evidentiary treatment in summary judgment practice.