The South Carolina Supreme Court granted an injunction against State Treasurer Curtis M. Loftis Jr. in a constitutional dispute over legislative compensation and separation of powers. The court issued its ruling November 12, 2025, in the case *David Wesley Climer v. Curtis M. Loftis Jr.*, following oral arguments heard October 22.
Petitioners David Wesley Climer and Carol Herring successfully challenged actions by Loftis, who serves as the state's top financial officer. The case also involved high-ranking legislative leaders as intervenor-respondents, including Senate President Thomas C. Alexander and House Speaker G. Murrell Smith Jr.
The dispute centers on fundamental constitutional principles regarding the separation of governmental powers. The court's per curiam opinion emphasizes that both federal and state constitutions grant the legislative branch exclusive authority to control and appropriate government funds. This constitutional framework has existed since the nation's founding, the court noted.
However, the opinion also acknowledges longstanding concerns about legislators using their financial authority to increase their own compensation. The South Carolina Constitution directly addresses this potential conflict of interest through specific provisions governing legislative pay.
Article III, Section 19 of the South Carolina Constitution establishes clear rules about legislative compensation increases. The provision prohibits current legislators from raising their own pay during their terms in office. However, the constitution permits legislators to approve pay increases that would take effect for future legislative sessions, affecting only subsequently elected or re-elected members.
This constitutional structure reflects the founders' understanding of both the necessity of legislative control over public finances and the potential for abuse of that power. The framers sought to balance these competing concerns by allowing compensation adjustments while preventing immediate self-benefit.
The case attracted significant legal firepower from multiple parties. Petitioners Climer and Herring were represented by Richard A. Harpootlian, a prominent Columbia attorney, along with Andrew R. Hand and Phillip Donald Barber from Richard A. Harpootlian, PA.
State Treasurer Loftis assembled a substantial defense team including M. Dawes Cooke Jr. and John William Fletcher from Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms in Charleston, as well as attorneys from the State Treasurer's Office: Shawn David Eubanks and Christopher Alton Majure.
The legislative leaders also retained extensive legal representation. Senate President Alexander was represented by multiple attorneys including Kenneth M. Moffitt, John Potter Hazzard V, and Cassidy Evans Murphy from Columbia, along with Sara Stinson Parrish and Tracey Colton Green from Burr & Foreman LLP.
House Speaker Smith's legal team included Mark Carroll Moore and Michael Antonio Parente from Maynard Nexsen PC in Columbia, as well as Andrew A. Mathias and Julia McDonald Tillman from the firm's Greenville office.
The case also drew attention from John Vernon Crangle of Columbia, who participated as a pro se amicus curiae, representing his own interests in the constitutional questions at issue.
The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction in hearing the case, indicating the matter's constitutional significance and the need for immediate resolution. Original jurisdiction cases bypass lower courts and go directly to the state's highest court, typically reserved for disputes involving state officials or urgent constitutional questions.
While the court's brief per curiam opinion outlines the constitutional framework governing legislative compensation, the specific factual dispute that prompted the injunction remains unclear from the available portions of the ruling. The involvement of the State Treasurer suggests the conflict may have involved implementation or administration of legislative pay decisions.
The presence of both legislative leaders as intervenor-respondents indicates the dispute likely affects the institutional interests of the General Assembly. Their participation suggests the case may have broader implications for how legislative compensation decisions are implemented and administered.
The injunction represents a significant judicial intervention in what appears to be an inter-branch governmental dispute. Such rulings can have lasting effects on the balance of power between South Carolina's executive and legislative branches.
The timing of the case, filed and resolved in late 2025, may relate to ongoing budget processes or recent legislative actions regarding compensation. The court's willingness to grant injunctive relief suggests urgent circumstances that required immediate judicial intervention.
This ruling adds to the body of South Carolina constitutional law interpreting the separation of powers doctrine and legislative compensation restrictions. The decision may influence future disputes involving similar constitutional questions and inter-branch conflicts.
The case demonstrates the ongoing relevance of foundational constitutional principles in modern governmental operations, particularly regarding financial authority and potential conflicts of interest in public service.