The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief to Andre T. Heatley Jr. on July 22, upholding his murder and armed robbery convictions and, in the process, overruling part of the court's 2013 decision in State v. Logan. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Few held that Heatley's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the circumstantial-evidence jury instruction that Logan had authorized.
Heatley was convicted in the January 28, 2016 killing of Deanndra Roach, his former girlfriend. The state presented largely circumstantial evidence that Heatley lured Roach to a field off Farrow Road in Columbia using instant messaging, then shot her twelve times while she sat in her car. According to the opinion, Heatley took Roach's credit card, tried to withdraw cash from three ATMs, changed clothes between attempts, and later used the card to buy a watch online. Cell phone location data placed the two together at the scene and the ATMs, and a firearms expert testified that a bullet recovered from Roach's ear matched a gun found in Heatley's car.
At trial, the court gave a reasonable doubt charge and instructed jurors on circumstantial evidence using the language recommended in State v. Grippon (1997). The jury convicted Heatley, and the court of appeals dismissed his direct appeal under Anders v. California. Heatley then sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his lawyer should have requested a Logan charge. At the PCR hearing, trial counsel acknowledged he had been unaware of Logan, responding "I am now" when asked. The PCR court, presided over by Judge Daniel Coble, found counsel's performance was not deficient and that Heatley was not prejudiced "given the case against him."
The central legal question was whether jurors weighing circumstantial evidence must be told the evidence has to point conclusively to guilt, on top of the ordinary requirement that the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court traced decades of shifting instructions, describing a progression that had "sparked confusion in the bench and bar" as the court variously adopted, criticized, abandoned and revived competing charges from 1939 forward. In Logan, a divided court had allowed defendants to request additional language directing jurors that the circumstances must "point conclusively to the guilt of the accused" and that proof fails where the evidence merely renders the defendant's behavior suspicious.
The court overruled that portion of Logan, aligning South Carolina with the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Holland v. United States (1954), which the concurring justices in Logan had urged. As Justice Few noted, quoting Holland, "If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more." The court explained that trial judges should still often find it useful to explain what circumstantial evidence is and to tell jurors that direct and circumstantial evidence carry equal weight, but drew a firm line on the additional step. "The trial court may not, however, add to the reasonable doubt standard by requiring the circumstances be consistent or point conclusively to guilt," the opinion states. Attorneys remain free to argue those points to the jury.
The court also clarified that its ruling does not disturb how trial judges assess circumstantial evidence when deciding directed-verdict motions, a distinction it identified as a longstanding source of the confusion. It further declined to make the Grippon charge mandatory, overruling State v. Cherry only to the extent that decision had called Grippon the sole and exclusive charge for circumstantial-evidence cases.
Applying that framework to Heatley's trial, the court found the instructions adequate. The trial court had explained the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence consistent with Grippon and had given a constitutionally sound reasonable doubt charge. "No more is required under Holland or under South Carolina law," the opinion states, and counsel was therefore not deficient in declining to request a Logan instruction.
The decision resolves years of uncertainty for South Carolina trial judges and criminal defense lawyers over which circumstantial-evidence instruction to give and when. Going forward, defendants can no longer demand the heightened Logan language, and prosecutors need not fear reversal for relying on the Grippon approach. The court dismissed a second issue on which it had originally granted review as improvidently granted. Chief Justice Kittredge and Justices James, Hill and Verdin concurred in Justice Few's opinion.