The New York Court of Appeals ruled Monday that a religious institution's termination of a teacher over a political blog post was protected by the ministerial exception, effectively barring the employee's claim under state labor law.

In *Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple* (2025 NY Slip Op 06958), the court addressed whether teacher Jessie Sander could pursue a wrongful termination claim after allegedly being fired for co-authoring a blog post critical of Israel and Zionism. Sander had argued her termination violated New York Labor Law Section 201-d(2)(c), which prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees based on legal "recreational activities."

The case presented novel questions about the scope of New York's employee protection statute and whether political expression constitutes protected "recreational activities." However, the court declined to resolve these statutory interpretation issues, instead ruling that Sander's claim was barred by the ministerial exception.

The ministerial exception, established by the U.S. Supreme Court, prevents courts from applying employment discrimination laws to disputes between religious institutions and their ministers. This doctrine protects religious organizations' autonomy in selecting and supervising their spiritual leaders without government interference.

Judge Halligan, writing for the court, noted that "whatever the scope of section 201-d, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the ministerial exception, which precludes application of employment discrimination laws to claims involving an employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers."

The court found that Sander's offer letter "conclusively establishes that her core teaching responsibilities were religious," bringing her within the ministerial exception's protection. This determination was crucial because it classified Sander as a minister for legal purposes, regardless of her formal title or ordination status.

The decision leaves unresolved important questions about New York Labor Law Section 201-d's scope. The statute, enacted in 1992, protects employees from adverse action based on legal "recreational activities" conducted outside work hours. The court acknowledged that "the Legislature appears not to have considered this problem when it enacted the statute in 1992, well before the proliferation of various mechanisms for disseminating information online."

This observation highlights the challenge of applying pre-internet employment laws to modern forms of political expression and online activism. The court explicitly "reserve[d] this question of statutory interpretation for another day," leaving employers and employees without clear guidance on whether blogging and social media posts constitute protected recreational activities.

Sander's case represents a growing trend of employment disputes involving employees' political expression on social media and other online platforms. The intersection of employee speech rights and employer interests has become increasingly complex as digital platforms make personal views more visible and permanent.

The ruling also reflects the ongoing tension between individual expression rights and institutional autonomy, particularly for religious organizations. Religious institutions have historically claimed broad authority to make employment decisions based on adherence to their beliefs and values, while employees have sought protection for off-duty political activities.

Westchester Reform Temple successfully argued that Sander's teaching position involved religious instruction, making her termination a matter of religious autonomy protected by the First Amendment. The temple's position was supported by Sander's offer letter, which the court found definitively established her religious teaching responsibilities.

The case's outcome may influence how other religious institutions approach employee political expression. While the ministerial exception provided protection here, institutions may still face scrutiny over which employees qualify as ministers and whether their termination decisions are truly based on religious considerations.

For employees at religious institutions, the decision clarifies that those with religious teaching responsibilities may have limited recourse when terminated for political expression. The ministerial exception's broad application means traditional employment protections may not apply to a wider range of positions than previously understood.

The court's decision to reserve the broader statutory interpretation questions for future cases suggests that non-religious employees may still have viable claims under Labor Law Section 201-d for termination based on political blogging or social media activity. However, employers may argue that such activities fall outside the statute's "recreational activities" protection.

Legal observers note that the case reflects broader societal debates about free speech, religious freedom, and workplace rights in the digital age. As online political expression becomes increasingly common, courts will likely face more cases requiring them to balance these competing interests.

The decision also highlights the complexity of applying decades-old employment laws to modern digital communication. The 1992 statute predated widespread internet use, leaving courts to interpret whether activities like blogging fit within traditional categories of protected employee conduct.

Moving forward, the ruling establishes important precedent for religious institutions' authority over employees with religious responsibilities. However, it leaves open questions about non-religious employees' protection for online political expression, setting up potential future litigation on these evolving workplace issues.