The New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion in *Krug v. State Parole Board*, addressing whether the State Parole Board's consideration of all available inmate information during parole hearings violates constitutional ex post facto protections when applied to crimes committed before 1997.
Fred Krug, who committed crimes in 1973 for which he remains incarcerated, challenged the Board's authority to review his complete record rather than limiting consideration to new information filed since his previous parole hearing. The case centers on competing interpretations of New Jersey's evolving parole statutes and their constitutional application.
The legal framework governing parole decisions in New Jersey has undergone several changes over the decades. The original Parole Act of 1948 permitted the Board to consider parole applications with reference to "all existing available records." This broad authority was later restricted under the Parole Act of 1979, which limited the Board's consideration during second or subsequent parole hearings to only "new information" filed since the prior hearing.
A 1997 amendment to the Parole Act abolished the new-information limitation that had been in place since 1979. The amendment restored the Board's authority to consider all relevant information about an inmate during second or subsequent parole hearings, effectively returning to the broader review standard that existed under the 1948 Act.
Krug's parole history spans multiple decades and numerous denials. The Parole Board denied his applications for parole in 1994, 1995, 2012, and 2016. In August 2022, Krug became eligible for parole for a fifth time. His disciplinary record shows thirty infractions while in prison, though he has remained largely infraction-free since 2003, with only one refusal to submit to a search in 2017.
The most recent parole proceeding occurred in January 2023, when a Board panel held a hearing and again denied Krug's application. The panel documented its decision by completing a one-page form with various checkboxes indicating reasons for denial. Significantly, the panel checked twelve boxes related to information from before 2016, along with four boxes possibly related to information gathered since the 2016 hearing. The panel also acknowledged six boxes for mitigating information in Krug's favor.
The critical determination came when the panel checked a box labeled "Prior to 8/19/1997" that stated: "The Panel has determined a substantial likelihood exists that you would commit a new crime if released on parole at this time." This finding resulted in setting Krug's future parole eligibility for thirty-six months.
Krug appealed the panel's decision to the full Board, raising several arguments including the contention that the panel violated the 1979 Act by presenting "no new evidence since previous denials of parole to justify his continued confinement." This argument formed the core of his ex post facto challenge, asserting that applying the 1997 amendment's expanded review authority to his case constituted an impermissible retroactive application of law.
The ex post facto challenge raises fundamental questions about the constitutional limits on retroactive application of parole laws. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits laws that retroactively increase punishment or disadvantage defendants. In the parole context, courts must determine whether changes in parole procedures that make release more difficult constitute prohibited ex post facto violations when applied to crimes committed before the law changed.
Krug's case presents a particularly complex scenario because it involves the restoration of broader review authority that existed at the time of his original crime in 1973. The 1997 amendment did not create new restrictions but rather eliminated limitations that had been imposed in 1979, six years after Krug's offense.
Justice Wainer Apter wrote the Court's opinion, though the complete text of the decision was not available in the provided materials. The Court's analysis would necessarily address the tension between the state's interest in thorough parole review and constitutional protections against retroactive punishment.
The case has implications beyond Krug's individual circumstances. The Court's interpretation of ex post facto protections in the parole context will guide future Board decisions for inmates whose crimes preceded the 1997 amendment. The ruling may also influence how other states approach similar constitutional challenges to evolving parole statutes.
For inmates like Krug who have been incarcerated for decades, the scope of information available for parole consideration can be extensive. The question of whether Boards should be limited to recent information or permitted to review comprehensive records touches on fundamental questions about rehabilitation, public safety, and the purpose of parole review.
The decision represents the New Jersey Supreme Court's attempt to balance these competing interests while adhering to constitutional requirements regarding retroactive application of laws that may disadvantage defendants or make punishment more severe.