The Nebraska Supreme Court issued an opinion in *State v. Keadle* on December 19, 2025, providing important guidance on how appellate courts should review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases. The decision, filed as case number S-25-128, addresses fundamental questions about the standard of review that appeals courts must apply when evaluating whether a defendant received constitutionally adequate legal representation.
The court held that appellate review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims presents "a mixed question of law and fact," requiring different standards of review for different aspects of the analysis. When reviewing factual findings made by lower courts regarding counsel's performance, appellate courts must apply a "clear error" standard, giving substantial deference to trial court findings. However, the court clarified that legal determinations about whether counsel's performance met constitutional standards or whether any deficiencies prejudiced the defendant must be reviewed independently by appeals courts.
This dual standard of review stems from the two-pronged test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Strickland v. Washington* (1984). Under *Strickland*, defendants claiming ineffective assistance must demonstrate both that their counsel's performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness and that this deficient performance prejudiced their defense. The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in *Keadle* provides procedural clarity about how state appellate courts should apply these constitutional standards.
The *Strickland* framework has governed ineffective assistance claims for more than 40 years, establishing that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to reasonably effective counsel. The test requires courts to evaluate counsel's conduct objectively, considering whether the attorney's representation fell below professional norms. Even if performance was deficient, defendants must also show prejudice – that there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different with competent counsel.
The *Keadle* decision addresses an important procedural question that frequently arises in criminal appeals: how much deference should appellate courts give to trial court findings when reviewing ineffective assistance claims. By distinguishing between factual findings that merit clear error review and legal conclusions that warrant independent review, the Nebraska Supreme Court provides a framework that balances judicial efficiency with constitutional protection.
This distinction matters significantly in practice. Under clear error review, appellate courts can only reverse factual findings if they are convinced the trial court made a mistake. This standard gives substantial deference to judges who observed witness testimony and other evidence firsthand. However, independent review allows appellate courts to reach their own conclusions about legal questions without deferring to lower court determinations.
The court also addressed the narrow scope of postconviction relief, reaffirming that such remedies are "available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional violations that render the judgment void or voidable." This language underscores that postconviction proceedings serve as a limited safety valve for addressing constitutional errors that fundamentally undermine the integrity of criminal convictions.
Postconviction relief typically becomes relevant when defendants discover constitutional violations that could not be raised on direct appeal, such as ineffective assistance of counsel claims that require evidence outside the trial record. The Nebraska Supreme Court's emphasis on the "very narrow category" of available relief reflects courts' general reluctance to relitigate criminal cases absent compelling constitutional concerns.
The *Keadle* decision comes at a time when ineffective assistance claims remain a significant component of criminal appeals nationwide. These claims often arise in cases involving complex legal issues, inadequate investigation by defense counsel, or conflicts of interest that compromise attorney loyalty to clients. The procedural standards established in *Keadle* will guide Nebraska courts in evaluating such claims going forward.
For defense attorneys, the decision reinforces the importance of meeting professional standards in criminal representation. The *Strickland* test, as applied through *Keadle*, requires counsel to conduct reasonable investigations, make informed strategic decisions, and provide zealous advocacy within ethical bounds. Attorneys who fall short of these standards risk not only professional consequences but also the possibility that their clients' convictions could be overturned.
The ruling also has implications for prosecutors and trial judges, who must be prepared to address ineffective assistance claims that may arise during proceedings or on appeal. Understanding the standards that appellate courts will apply helps all participants in the criminal justice system better evaluate and respond to constitutional challenges.
Looking ahead, the *Keadle* decision will likely be cited frequently in Nebraska criminal appeals involving ineffective assistance claims. The court's clarification of review standards provides predictability for attorneys and judges while ensuring that constitutional violations receive appropriate scrutiny. This balance between procedural efficiency and constitutional protection reflects ongoing efforts to maintain fair and effective criminal justice processes.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision demonstrates the continuing evolution of ineffective assistance jurisprudence as courts work to implement constitutional protections in practical procedural frameworks.