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Montana Supreme Court Denies Postconviction Relief in Kapps Case

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed a Fallon County District Court's denial of Mark Kapps's petition for postconviction relief, rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the court's opinion on December 23, 2025.

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Seal of the Montana Supreme Court

Case Information

Case No.:
DA 23-0646
Judges:
Gustafson

Key Takeaways

  • Montana Supreme Court affirmed denial of Mark Kapps's postconviction relief petition
  • Kapps claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case
  • Case originated from 2014 events in Baker, Montana involving Kapps and his fiancé

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's denial of postconviction relief for Mark Kapps, who argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case. Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the court's opinion on December 23, 2025, in *Kapps v. State of Montana* (2025 MT 295).

Kapps appealed from an order by the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District in Fallon County, which denied his petition for postconviction relief. The original criminal case stemmed from events on August 3, 2014, when Kapps drove his fiancé, Miranda Thomas, to work at the Sagebrush Inn in Baker, Montana. Thomas worked with her sister, Stephanie Craig, who managed the inn and lived on site in a home attached to the establishment.

The district court had initially denied Kapps's claims on both procedural grounds and on the merits. However, the State acknowledged on appeal that Kapps's claims were not procedurally barred, leading the Supreme Court to focus solely on the substantive merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations.

The case was submitted on briefs to the Montana Supreme Court on October 8, 2025, with the court issuing its decision approximately two and a half months later. Kapps was represented by Nicholas T. Hine of Hine Law PLLC in Brooklyn, New York, while the State was represented by Montana Attorney General Austin Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General Mardell Ployhar, Fallon County Attorney Darcy Wassmann, and Special Deputy County Attorney Thorin Geist.

The Supreme Court framed the issue on appeal as whether the district court erred in denying Kapps's petition for postconviction relief on the merits. This formulation came after the State's concession that procedural bars did not apply to Kapps's claims, effectively removing that defense from consideration.

Postconviction relief petitions in Montana allow defendants to challenge their convictions or sentences on grounds that were not or could not have been raised on direct appeal. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are among the most common grounds for such petitions, as they typically require development of a factual record beyond what is available in the original trial proceedings.

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioners must generally demonstrate two elements under the standard established in *Strickland v. Washington*: first, that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The deficient performance prong requires showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, while the prejudice prong requires demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

The Montana Supreme Court's decision to affirm the district court's denial suggests that Kapps failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, though the full reasoning remains unclear from the available excerpts. Courts often scrutinize ineffective assistance claims carefully, given the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

The case originated in the Sixteenth Judicial District under Cause No. DV-2022-20, with the Honorable Nickolas C. Murnion presiding. The "DV" designation typically indicates domestic violence charges, though the specific nature of the underlying criminal case is not detailed in the available portions of the opinion.

Fallon County, where the case originated, is located in southeastern Montana and includes the city of Baker, where the events giving rise to the criminal charges occurred. The county is part of Montana's Sixteenth Judicial District, which covers several rural counties in the eastern part of the state.

The involvement of out-of-state counsel for Kapps, with his attorney based in Brooklyn, New York, suggests either specialized expertise or personal connections that led to this representation arrangement. Montana allows out-of-state attorneys to appear pro hac vice in specific cases with court approval.

This decision adds to Montana Supreme Court jurisprudence on postconviction relief and ineffective assistance of counsel standards. While the full implications of the ruling await publication of the complete opinion, the court's affirmance of the district court's denial indicates that Kapps's specific claims did not meet the legal standards required for relief.

The case demonstrates the challenging nature of postconviction relief proceedings, where petitioners must overcome high legal standards to secure new trials or other remedies. Success rates for such petitions are generally low, reflecting courts' reluctance to relitigate cases absent compelling evidence of fundamental errors.

For Kapps, the Montana Supreme Court's decision likely represents the end of his state court challenges, though federal habeas corpus proceedings might remain available depending on the nature of his claims and the procedural history of his case.

Topics

ineffective assistance of counselchild molestationcriminal appealspostconviction reliefprocedural law

Original Source: courtlistener

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