The Michigan Supreme Court issued a decision in *People v. Kardasz*, a case that addresses lifetime electronic monitoring requirements for individuals convicted of criminal sexual conduct. The court decided the case on Dec. 19, 2025, following oral arguments on March 12, 2025.
Robert J. Kardasz was convicted by a jury in the Macomb Circuit Court of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Michigan Compiled Laws sections 750.520b(1)(a) and 750.520b(2)(b). Judge Michael E. Servitto initially sentenced Kardasz to serve 360 to 550 months in prison and imposed lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520n. The court also ordered compliance with the Sex Offenders Registration Act.
The case's procedural history reveals multiple appeals and resentencing proceedings. Kardasz first appealed his conviction and sentence to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In an unpublished per curiam opinion issued Nov. 19, 2019, the Court of Appeals panel, consisting of Presiding Judge Cameron and Judges Cavanagh and Shapiro, affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence. The appeals court remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court had exceeded the 25-year statutory minimum sentence without providing adequate explanation for why a 30-year sentence was proportionate to the offense.
Following the Court of Appeals decision, the trial court resentenced Kardasz on remand to serve 300 to 480 months in prison, equivalent to 25 to 40 years. The court again ordered lifetime electronic monitoring and registration under SORA. This resentencing maintained the lifetime electronic monitoring provision that would become central to the Supreme Court case.
Kardasz appealed the resentencing, specifically challenging the lifetime electronic monitoring requirement. The case then proceeded through the appellate system, ultimately reaching the Michigan Supreme Court through an application for leave to appeal.
The Michigan Supreme Court's consideration of this case comes amid ongoing legal debates about the scope and application of lifetime electronic monitoring for sex offenders. Under MCL 750.520n, courts have authority to impose electronic monitoring as part of sentencing for certain criminal sexual conduct convictions, but questions remain about the circumstances under which such monitoring is appropriate and proportionate.
Lifetime electronic monitoring represents a significant post-incarceration restriction that can affect where individuals live, work, and travel. The technology requires offenders to wear ankle monitors that track their location continuously, with violations potentially resulting in additional criminal penalties. Supporters argue that electronic monitoring provides an important public safety tool that helps prevent recidivism and protects potential victims. Critics contend that lifetime monitoring can constitute excessive punishment that impedes rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
The Sex Offenders Registration Act, under which Kardasz must also comply, requires individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses to register with law enforcement and maintain updated information about their residence, employment, and other personal details. This registration requirement works in conjunction with electronic monitoring to create comprehensive oversight of convicted sex offenders.
First-degree criminal sexual conduct under Michigan law encompasses the most serious forms of sexual assault, including cases involving penetration under specific aggravating circumstances such as the use of force or coercion, commission during another felony, or involvement of vulnerable victims. The offense carries severe penalties, including lengthy prison sentences and post-conviction supervision requirements.
The case reflects broader trends in criminal justice regarding the use of technology for offender supervision. Electronic monitoring has expanded significantly in recent years as courts and corrections agencies seek alternatives to incarceration while maintaining public safety oversight. However, legal challenges to monitoring requirements have also increased, with defendants arguing that lifetime monitoring can violate constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
Michigan's approach to electronic monitoring for sex offenders places it among states that have implemented comprehensive technological supervision systems. The state's framework combines traditional registration requirements with modern tracking technology to monitor offenders after their release from prison.
The Supreme Court's decision in *Kardasz* will likely provide important guidance to trial courts throughout Michigan regarding the appropriate application of lifetime electronic monitoring in criminal sexual conduct cases. The ruling may clarify the standards courts should apply when determining whether to impose such monitoring and the factors that should be considered in making that determination.
The case also highlights the complex interplay between punishment, public safety, and constitutional rights in the context of sex offense sentencing. As electronic monitoring technology continues to evolve and become more prevalent in criminal justice systems, courts must balance competing interests while ensuring that sentences remain proportionate to the offenses committed.