The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a ruling Tuesday establishing new standards for when attorneys who fail to pursue plea negotiations at their client's request may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision in *Commonwealth v. Gary E. Mosso* addresses constitutional questions that have persisted for more than 40 years since the original homicide conviction.
The case involves Gary E. Mosso, who was indicted for homicide in Worcester County Superior Court on March 8, 1984. Following an initial review by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1987, Mosso filed a motion for a new trial on Oct. 18, 2016, more than three decades after his conviction.
Justice Elspeth Cypher Wolohojian, writing for the court, addressed the central question of whether a defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to effective counsel when his attorney allegedly ignored his request to initiate plea negotiations with the prosecutor.
The court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be established where a defendant demonstrates two elements: first, that it was unreasonable under the circumstances for the attorney to ignore the defendant's request to explore the possibility of a plea bargain, and second, that prejudice resulted from the attorney's failure to heed the defendant's reasonable request.
To establish prejudice in this context, the court ruled that the defendant must show there was a reasonable probability the prosecutor would have accepted the plea offer the defendant requested his attorney to pursue. This standard creates a new framework for evaluating attorney performance in plea negotiation scenarios.
The ruling comes after Judge J. Gavin Reardon Jr. heard the motion for a new trial and considered a motion for reconsideration. Justice David Kafker subsequently allowed a request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court.
The case was argued by Paul R. Rudof, with Michael Hussey also present for the defendant. Assistant District Attorney Donna-Marie Haran represented the Commonwealth. The proceedings spanned from September 8 through December 3, 2025, before a seven-justice panel including Chief Justice Kimberly Budd and Justices Frank Gaziano, David Kafker, Dalila Wendlandt, Serge Georges, Scott Dewar, and Wolohojian.
The constitutional issues at stake center on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and how that protection extends to plea bargaining procedures. The court's decision acknowledges the critical role plea negotiations play in the criminal justice system, where the vast majority of cases are resolved through plea agreements rather than trials.
The ruling establishes that attorneys have a constitutional obligation to pursue plea negotiations when reasonably requested by their clients. This requirement recognizes that competent counsel must be responsive to client directives regarding fundamental strategic decisions in criminal defense.
The two-part test established by the court creates both a performance standard and a prejudice requirement. The performance prong asks whether the attorney's conduct fell below objective standards of reasonableness, while the prejudice prong requires demonstrating that different attorney conduct would have resulted in a different outcome.
By requiring defendants to show a reasonable probability that prosecutors would have accepted proposed plea offers, the court balances protecting constitutional rights with avoiding speculative claims. This standard prevents defendants from claiming ineffective assistance based on hypothetical plea agreements that had no realistic chance of acceptance.
The decision affects how defense attorneys must handle client communications regarding plea options. Attorneys who receive explicit instructions from clients to pursue plea negotiations may face constitutional scrutiny if they fail to act on those instructions without adequate justification.
The lengthy timeline of this case, spanning from the 1984 indictment through the 2025 Supreme Judicial Court decision, illustrates the complex procedural path available for challenging decades-old convictions on constitutional grounds. The fact that Mosso was able to file a successful motion for new trial consideration more than 30 years after his conviction demonstrates the enduring nature of constitutional claims.
This ruling joins a growing body of Supreme Court and state court precedents recognizing that the right to counsel extends beyond trial representation to include competent handling of plea negotiations. The decision reinforces that attorneys must be attentive to client preferences regarding fundamental strategic choices in criminal defense.
The *Mosso* decision will likely influence how Massachusetts courts evaluate future ineffective assistance claims related to plea bargaining. Defense attorneys must now ensure they adequately respond to client requests for plea negotiations or risk constitutional challenges to their representation.
The ruling also provides guidance to trial courts handling motions for new trial based on ineffective assistance claims. Courts must now apply the two-part test when evaluating whether attorneys' failure to pursue requested plea negotiations violated constitutional standards.
This precedent establishes Massachusetts among states that have explicitly recognized attorney obligations in plea negotiation contexts, contributing to evolving constitutional protections in criminal procedure.