The Supreme Court of Maryland issued an opinion in *Clarke v. Gibson* that clarifies several important procedural aspects of domestic violence protective order cases, establishing new precedents for appellate preservation, due process requirements, and evidence standards.
In the case decided during the September 2025 term, the court addressed three distinct legal issues that frequently arise in protective order proceedings. The opinion, written by Justice Eaves, stems from Anne Arundel County Circuit Court Case No. C-02-FM-24-807342, which was argued before the high court on Sept. 4, 2025.
The first major ruling concerned appellate procedure and the preservation of issues for appeal. The court held that respondent Philip Clarke failed to properly preserve for appellate review his challenge to the circuit court's handling of hearing scheduling requirements. Specifically, Clarke argued that the circuit court erred by not stating on the record whether good cause existed to set a hearing on a final protective order for a date beyond seven days from when he was served with the temporary protective order.
The Supreme Court of Maryland determined that because this issue was not properly preserved in the lower court proceedings, it could not be reviewed on appeal. This ruling reinforces the fundamental principle that parties must raise objections and legal arguments at the trial level to preserve them for appellate consideration.
The court's second holding addressed a constitutional question regarding procedural due process rights in protective order cases. Clarke contended that due process required him to be served with both the temporary protective order and the underlying petition simultaneously. The court rejected this argument, holding that service of the temporary protective order alone satisfies procedural due process requirements under both the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The court explained that the petition would not provide Clarke with any information or protections beyond what was already contained in the temporary protective order itself. Since Clarke did not challenge the adequacy of the procedural protections afforded by the temporary protective order, the court found no constitutional violation in the service procedures.
This ruling provides important clarity for law enforcement and court personnel who serve protective orders throughout Maryland. The decision confirms that existing service procedures comply with constitutional requirements, potentially streamlining the protective order process while maintaining due process protections.
The third and perhaps most significant aspect of the ruling concerned evidence standards for final protective orders. The Supreme Court of Maryland found that the Appellate Court of Maryland had erred in its analysis of whether sufficient evidence existed to grant a final protective order against Clarke.
The lower appellate court had relied primarily on the circuit court's negative credibility determination regarding Clarke's testimony at the final protective order hearing. However, the Supreme Court held that such credibility determinations alone cannot satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof.
Under Maryland Code Annotated, Family Law Section 4-506(c)(1)(ii), petitioners must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that alleged abuse occurred. The court clarified that while credibility determinations are important factors in evaluating testimony, they cannot substitute for affirmative evidence supporting the petitioner's claims.
This ruling establishes that courts cannot grant final protective orders based solely on their assessment that a respondent's testimony lacks credibility. Instead, petitioners must present sufficient evidence to meet their burden of proof, even when respondents provide testimony that the court finds unconvincing.
The decision has significant implications for how circuit courts across Maryland evaluate evidence in protective order proceedings. It emphasizes that the burden of proof remains with petitioners throughout the process and that negative credibility findings, while relevant, do not automatically satisfy evidentiary requirements.
Legal practitioners representing both petitioners and respondents in domestic violence cases will need to adjust their strategies in light of this ruling. Petitioners must ensure they present sufficient affirmative evidence to support their claims, while respondents may find additional protection against orders based primarily on credibility determinations.
The *Clarke v. Gibson* decision also provides guidance for trial courts handling protective order cases. Judges must carefully distinguish between credibility assessments and the substantive evidence required to meet legal standards for granting protective orders.
This comprehensive ruling addresses three distinct areas of protective order law that frequently generate litigation. By clarifying appellate preservation requirements, constitutional service standards, and evidence sufficiency criteria, the Supreme Court of Maryland has provided important guidance for lower courts and practitioners handling domestic violence cases.
The decision reflects the court's careful balance between protecting victims of domestic violence and ensuring that respondents receive appropriate due process protections. While maintaining existing service procedures that facilitate swift protective order implementation, the court has also reinforced evidence standards that protect against orders lacking adequate factual support.