The Colorado Supreme Court ruled Feb. 2 that key provisions of the state's anti-SLAPP statute are unconstitutional because they improperly allow county court final judgments to be appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, bypassing the constitutional hierarchy for appellate review.
The court held in *Hinds v. Foreman* that sections 13-20-1101 and 13-4-102.2 of Colorado Revised Statutes violate Article VI, Section 17 of the Colorado Constitution, which requires final judgments from county courts to be reviewed either by district courts or the Supreme Court itself.
The case arose when Rebeca Hinds sought to appeal a county court's final judgment granting Corrine Foreman's special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP law. Anti-SLAPP statutes are designed to protect defendants from strategic lawsuits against public participation that aim to chill free speech and petition rights.
The constitutional issue centered on whether the anti-SLAPP statute could authorize the Court of Appeals to review final judgments from county courts. The Colorado Constitution establishes a specific appellate structure that requires county court final judgments to follow particular appeal pathways.
Writing for the court, Justice Berkenkotter explained that the Supreme Court accepted transfer of the case from the Court of Appeals under multiple statutory provisions because the issue involved "matters of substance not previously determined by this court."
The court's analysis focused on the intersection between Colorado's anti-SLAPP protections and the state's constitutional framework for appellate jurisdiction. Anti-SLAPP laws have become increasingly important tools for protecting defendants against meritless lawsuits designed to silence criticism or public participation through expensive litigation.
The Colorado anti-SLAPP statute, codified at section 13-20-1101, allows defendants to file special motions to dismiss cases that target protected speech or petitioning activities. These motions can provide early dismissal of cases that lack merit, potentially saving defendants significant litigation costs.
However, the court determined that the statutory provisions allowing direct appeals to the Court of Appeals from county court final judgments in anti-SLAPP cases exceeded constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. The Colorado Constitution requires that appellate review of county court final judgments follow specific pathways.
Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Colorado Constitution, final judgments from county courts must be appealed either to district courts or directly to the Supreme Court in certain circumstances. The constitution does not authorize direct appeals from county courts to the intermediate Court of Appeals for final judgments.
The court concluded that the Court of Appeals "lacks jurisdiction over the petitioner's appeal" because the statutory provisions unconstitutionally granted that court authority it does not possess under the state constitution.
As a result of this jurisdictional finding, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals "with directions to dismiss the appeal." This means Hinds's challenge to the county court's anti-SLAPP dismissal cannot proceed through the Court of Appeals as originally attempted.
The ruling has significant implications for future anti-SLAPP appeals from county courts in Colorado. Parties seeking to appeal final anti-SLAPP rulings from county courts will need to follow the constitutionally prescribed appeal routes rather than the pathway previously allowed by statute.
The decision underscores the Supreme Court's role in ensuring that statutory provisions comply with constitutional requirements, even when those provisions serve important policy goals like protecting free speech through anti-SLAPP protections.
Colorado's anti-SLAPP law remains in effect for its primary purpose of providing early dismissal mechanisms for meritless lawsuits targeting protected speech. However, the appeal procedures for county court final judgments under the statute must now conform to constitutional requirements.
The case involved attorneys Dan Ernst of Ernst Legal Group representing Hinds, while Foreman was represented by J. Casey Martin, Laurel Quinto, and Quentin H. Morse of JVAM PLLC.
The unanimous decision was joined by Chief Justice Marquez and Justices Boatright, Hood, Gabriel, and Samour, indicating broad agreement on the court about the constitutional issues presented.
This ruling clarifies the limits of legislative authority to create appellate pathways that conflict with constitutional mandates, while preserving the substantive protections that anti-SLAPP laws provide to defendants facing strategic litigation designed to chill protected speech and petitioning activities.