The Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that plaintiffs who obtain only preliminary injunctive relief before their case becomes moot do not qualify as "prevailing parties" eligible for attorney fees under federal civil rights law.
In *Lackey v. Stinnie*, the high court held that drivers who successfully challenged Virginia's statute suspending licenses for unpaid court fines cannot recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because no court conclusively ruled on the merits before the case became moot.
The case began when drivers whose licenses were suspended under Virginia law sued the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the statute as unconstitutional. The U.S. District Court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Commissioner from enforcing the statute.
Before the case could proceed to trial on the merits, the Virginia General Assembly repealed the contested statute and required reinstatement of licenses suspended under the law. With the statute no longer in effect, the parties agreed to dismiss the case as moot.
The drivers then sought attorney fees under Section 1988(b), which allows fee awards to "prevailing parties" in civil rights cases brought under Section 1983. The district court declined to award fees, ruling that parties who obtain only a preliminary injunction do not qualify as "prevailing parties."
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals initially affirmed the district court's decision. However, the full Fourth Circuit reversed en banc, holding that some preliminary injunctions can provide lasting, merits-based relief that qualifies plaintiffs as prevailing parties, even when the case becomes moot before final judgment.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's analysis. The court held that the plaintiff drivers do not qualify as "prevailing parties" eligible for attorney fees under Section 1988(b) because no court conclusively ruled on the constitutional merits of their challenge.
The decision addresses a recurring issue in civil rights litigation: what happens when government entities change their policies or when legislatures repeal contested laws after plaintiffs file suit but before courts issue final rulings. Such scenarios often leave plaintiffs who invested significant resources in litigation without clear legal victories that would traditionally justify fee awards.
Section 1988(b) was enacted to encourage private enforcement of civil rights laws by allowing successful plaintiffs to recover attorney fees from defendants. The "prevailing party" requirement ensures that fee awards go to plaintiffs who achieve some measure of success on the merits of their claims.
The Court's ruling clarifies that preliminary relief alone, without a definitive court ruling on the underlying legal issues, does not establish prevailing party status sufficient for fee awards. This standard requires plaintiffs to secure more than temporary restraints on government action to qualify for fee recovery.
The decision may influence how civil rights attorneys approach cases where government policies face legal challenge. Knowing that preliminary injunctions alone may not support fee awards could affect litigation strategies and settlement negotiations in similar cases.
The ruling also impacts how government entities might respond to civil rights challenges. The decision suggests that repealing contested laws or changing policies before final court rulings can limit exposure to attorney fee awards, even when preliminary injunctions suggest plaintiffs might ultimately prevail.
Legal observers note that the decision balances the policy of encouraging civil rights enforcement through fee awards against the principle that fee recovery should follow meaningful legal victories. The Court's approach requires more than procedural success to justify shifting attorney fees to defendants.
The Virginia case reflects broader tensions in civil rights litigation over when plaintiffs achieve sufficient success to warrant fee awards. Courts have struggled with cases where government action changes during litigation, particularly when such changes appear responsive to legal challenges but occur before definitive court rulings.
For civil rights practitioners, the decision emphasizes the importance of securing final judgments or consent decrees that clearly establish legal violations when seeking fee awards. Preliminary relief, however effective in stopping challenged conduct, may prove insufficient for fee recovery purposes.
The ruling affects ongoing civil rights litigation nationwide, particularly cases challenging government policies that face potential legislative or administrative changes during court proceedings. Plaintiffs in such cases now have clearer guidance about the level of legal success required to support attorney fee claims.
The decision was issued February 25, 2025, following oral arguments held October 8, 2024. The case number is 23-621, and the full citation will be *Lackey v. Stinnie*, 604 U.S. ___ (2025) when the bound volume is published.
The ruling provides important clarification for the civil rights bar about prevailing party standards while potentially affecting how government entities respond to constitutional challenges of their policies and practices.