Constitutional law professor Carolyn Shapiro has criticized the Supreme Court for creating legal conditions that enable federal law enforcement misconduct, pointing to recent Department of Homeland Security operations in Minneapolis as evidence of unchecked governmental power.
In early 2026, DHS agents shot and killed two U.S. citizens in Minneapolis while conducting immigration enforcement operations. Video evidence has documented agents knocking people to the ground, forcibly removing individuals from vehicles, spraying pepper spray directly into faces, making warrantless arrests, and demanding proof of citizenship from people of color while sometimes rejecting valid documentation.
Shapiro, who writes the "Cases and Controversies" series for SCOTUSblog, argues that when citizens ask whether such conduct is constitutional and why courts don't intervene, the answer lies in decades of Supreme Court decisions that have progressively limited legal remedies for constitutional violations.
"The Supreme Court has, over decades, made it increasingly difficult – sometimes impossible – to enforce or vindicate constitutional rights and to redress, much less stop, widespread and systemic governmental lawlessness of the sort we are now seeing," Shapiro wrote.
The professor notes that federal actors face even fewer constraints than state and local officials when violating constitutional rights. Legal scholar Alex Reinert has observed this irony: federal officials have more leeway to violate the federal Constitution with impunity than their state and local counterparts.
Traditionally, courts address constitutional violations through two primary mechanisms: lawsuits seeking monetary damages after violations occur and suits for injunctive relief to prevent ongoing or imminent constitutional harms. Both pathways now face substantial obstacles created by Supreme Court precedent.
For monetary damages against state and local officials, the primary legal tool is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Reconstruction-era statute that creates a cause of action for federal rights violations by officials acting "under color of" state law. However, this remedy has been significantly weakened by the Supreme Court's expansion of qualified immunity doctrine, which protects government officials from lawsuits unless they violated "clearly established" constitutional rights.
The situation is even more restrictive for federal officials. Unlike state and local officials who can be sued under Section 1983, no comparable federal statute exists for constitutional violations by federal agents. Instead, plaintiffs must rely on implied causes of action derived from Supreme Court precedent, which the court has made increasingly difficult to establish.
The Supreme Court's approach to these "Bivens" actions – named after the 1971 case *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents* – has become progressively more restrictive. The court has repeatedly declined to recognize new categories of constitutional claims against federal officials, effectively immunizing entire areas of federal law enforcement from civil liability.
For injunctive relief, plaintiffs face additional hurdles including standing requirements, sovereign immunity doctrines, and the court's restrictive approach to structural reform litigation. The Supreme Court has made it increasingly difficult to obtain court orders that would prevent ongoing constitutional violations by government agencies.
These legal barriers create what Shapiro characterizes as a system where federal agents can engage in potentially unconstitutional conduct with minimal risk of legal consequences. The recent Minneapolis incidents illustrate this dynamic: despite video evidence of questionable tactics and fatal shootings, affected individuals face limited legal recourse.
The constitutional violations documented in Minneapolis include Fourth Amendment concerns regarding warrantless arrests and excessive force, Fifth Amendment due process violations in detention procedures, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues related to racial profiling in citizenship verification demands.
Shapiro's analysis suggests that the current legal framework represents a departure from the Constitution's original design. The Reconstruction Amendments and accompanying enforcement legislation were specifically intended to provide robust federal remedies for constitutional violations, yet Supreme Court interpretations have systematically narrowed these protections.
The professor's critique extends beyond individual cases to question the broader implications for constitutional democracy. When government officials can violate constitutional rights with impunity, it undermines the rule of law and erodes public trust in democratic institutions.
The Minneapolis incidents occurred during expanded federal immigration enforcement operations, raising questions about the balance between enforcement priorities and constitutional protections. Legal observers note that immigration enforcement has become an area where constitutional violations often go unchallenged due to the legal barriers Shapiro describes.
As these enforcement operations continue, affected communities have limited options for legal recourse. Civil rights organizations may pursue federal court challenges, but face the doctrinal obstacles that Shapiro identifies. Congressional oversight remains a possibility, though its effectiveness depends on political dynamics.
The professor's analysis highlights a fundamental tension in American constitutional law: while the Constitution guarantees certain rights, the Supreme Court's interpretation of enforcement mechanisms has made those guarantees increasingly hollow in practice, particularly when violated by federal officials.