The First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Monday in *Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board* on a critical question affecting prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief: when second-in-time petitions trigger stringent federal restrictions.
Joseph Donovan sought to file a second-in-time application for habeas relief against the Massachusetts Parole Board. The central issue on appeal was whether Donovan must satisfy the demanding "gatekeeping" requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) before proceeding with his petition.
The answer, according to Circuit Judge Montecalvo's opinion, depends on whether Donovan's second-in-time petition qualifies as a "second or successive . . . application" under federal statute. The court noted that petitioners must satisfy the gatekeeping requirements only if their petition falls within this statutory definition.
The First Circuit relied heavily on recent Supreme Court precedent in analyzing this question. In *Rivers v. Guerrero* (2025), the Supreme Court clarified that the phrase "second or successive . . . application" in § 2244(b) does not automatically "refer to all habeas filings [under 28 U.S.C. § 2254] made second or successively in time, following an initial application."
This distinction carries enormous practical significance for prisoners. The gatekeeping requirements under § 2244(b) create substantial barriers for habeas petitioners. These requirements generally mandate that petitioners obtain permission from the appropriate federal circuit court before filing second or successive applications, a process that requires meeting specific substantive standards.
The Supreme Court has established that "second or successive . . . application" constitutes a "term of art" in federal habeas law, as referenced in the *Rivers* decision. This technical designation means courts cannot simply count petitions chronologically to determine whether the restrictions apply.
The *Donovan* case builds on precedent from *Banister v. Davis* (2019), another Supreme Court decision that helped define the boundaries of what constitutes successive habeas applications. The interplay between these cases demonstrates the evolving nature of federal habeas jurisprudence and the ongoing refinement of statutory interpretation.
The Massachusetts Attorney General's office, represented by Assistant Attorney General Gabriel T. Thornton under Attorney General Andrea Joy Campbell, argued for the appellee Massachusetts Parole Board. The petitioner was represented by Paul K. Donovan of Donovan Legal PLLC.
The case originated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV. The First Circuit panel consisted of Circuit Judges Montecalvo, Lynch, and Kayatta.
This ruling has implications beyond Massachusetts, as it provides guidance for federal courts throughout the First Circuit on how to analyze second-in-time habeas petitions. The decision affects prisoners in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island who may seek to file multiple habeas corpus applications.
The timing of the decision, issued on Dec. 23, 2025, suggests the court prioritized resolving this procedural question that affects numerous pending and future habeas cases. Federal habeas corpus law has grown increasingly complex, with courts required to navigate intricate statutory requirements and Supreme Court precedents.
The gatekeeping provisions in § 2244(b) were designed to prevent abuse of the habeas system while preserving access to relief for meritorious claims. However, the application of these requirements has generated substantial litigation over their precise scope and timing.
For practitioners in the habeas corpus field, the *Donovan* decision provides important clarification on when the AEDPA's restrictions apply to second-in-time petitions. The ruling underscores the importance of careful analysis of each petition's relationship to prior filings rather than relying solely on chronological counting.
The case also highlights the ongoing tension between finality in criminal proceedings and ensuring access to federal habeas relief for prisoners with potentially meritorious constitutional claims. This balance remains a central challenge in federal habeas jurisprudence.
Looking ahead, the *Donovan* decision may influence how district courts within the First Circuit analyze similar cases involving multiple habeas filings. The ruling provides a framework for distinguishing between petitions that trigger gatekeeping requirements and those that do not, potentially streamlining the review process for appropriate cases while maintaining necessary restrictions on truly successive applications.