The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's decision allowing defendant Eunice Salley to represent herself in criminal proceedings, rejecting her appeal that claimed the district court erred in permitting self-representation. The court held that Salley's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary despite facing serious criminal charges.
In *United States v. Eunice D. Salley* (7th Cir. 2026), Circuit Judge Lee wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel that included Chief Judge Brennan and Circuit Judge Kirsch. The case arose from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, where Judge Robert M. Dow Jr. presided over the original proceedings.
The criminal charges stem from an elaborate fraud scheme involving Salley's deceased grandmother's pension payments and a separate tax preparation fraud operation. According to court documents, Salley's grandmother, Estella Salley, began receiving monthly pension payments from her former employer upon retirement in 1978. The payments were mailed to the residence where both women lived.
When Estella passed away in April 2009, the pension payments should have ceased since she had not designated a beneficiary. However, investigators discovered that Salley executed several affidavits falsely stating that her grandmother was still alive, allowing her to continue receiving the pension payments illegally.
The fraud extended beyond the pension scheme. Federal investigators revealed that Salley operated a tax preparation business where she prepared and filed false income tax returns for numerous clients. These fraudulent returns claimed fictitious refunds, from which Salley took substantial cuts. Additionally, prosecutors alleged that Salley failed to report five stolen pension payments as income on her own tax filings.
A federal grand jury charged Salley with one count of mail fraud under federal statutes, though the document excerpt does not detail the complete list of charges she faced. The case number 1:19-cr-797 indicates the criminal proceedings began in 2019.
Throughout the criminal proceedings, Salley consistently insisted on representing herself rather than accepting court-appointed or retained counsel. This decision proved central to her eventual appeal. The right to self-representation in criminal cases is protected under the Sixth Amendment, as established in *Faretta v. California* (1975), but courts must ensure that any waiver of counsel is made knowingly and voluntarily.
On appeal, Salley argued that the district court committed error by allowing her to proceed without legal representation. She requested a new trial based on this claimed error. However, the Seventh Circuit found no merit in her argument.
Circuit Judge Lee emphasized that the trial record demonstrated Salley's waiver of counsel met the constitutional standards for a knowing and voluntary decision. The court noted that "from the start of her criminal proceedings, Eunice Salley insisted that she did not want to be represented by counsel despite facing serious charges."
The appeals court's decision reinforces the principle that defendants have a constitutional right to represent themselves in criminal proceedings, even when facing serious felony charges that could result in substantial prison sentences. Courts must balance respecting a defendant's autonomy with ensuring they understand the risks of self-representation.
The case highlights ongoing tensions in the criminal justice system between defendants' constitutional rights and practical considerations about effective representation. While the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel, it also protects a defendant's right to waive that assistance if done with full understanding of the consequences.
The opinion, argued on May 15, 2024, and decided on Feb. 10, 2026, represents a relatively straightforward application of established precedent regarding self-representation rights. The unanimous decision suggests the panel found Salley's arguments lacked sufficient merit to warrant reversal.
Interestingly, the court noted that although Salley legally changed her name to Oya Awanata at some point, the opinion continues to refer to her as Eunice Salley because that was the name she used during the criminal proceedings.
The case serves as a reminder that defendants cannot later claim ineffective assistance of counsel or inadequate representation when they voluntarily chose to represent themselves at trial. Courts typically conduct thorough colloquies with defendants to ensure they understand the risks and complexities of self-representation before allowing them to proceed without counsel.
For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of creating a clear record when defendants seek to waive their right to counsel. District courts must document that such waivers are made with full knowledge of the charges, potential penalties, and disadvantages of self-representation.
The case also demonstrates how appellate courts will scrutinize the trial record to determine whether constitutional requirements were met, even when defendants later claim the trial court's decisions were erroneous.