The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petition for panel rehearing in *Berryman v. Huffman* and withdrew its prior opinion from 2025, substituting a brief affirmation of the lower court's ruling. The case involves petitioner Brian Scott Berryman and Brand Huffman, Superintendent of a Mississippi correctional facility.
The court's action, filed Jan. 8, 2026, represents an unusual procedural move where the three-judge panel reconsidered its earlier decision. The original panel opinion, *Berryman v. Huffman*, 157 F.4th 399 (5th Cir. 2025), was formally withdrawn and replaced with a terse per curiam ruling that simply stated "AFFIRMED" under Circuit Rule 47.6.
The case originated from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi under docket number 1:22-CV-140. The appeal was heard by Circuit Judges Wiener, Douglas, and Ramirez, though the court treated the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing.
Circuit Judge Dana Douglas issued a dissenting opinion that provides insight into the underlying case. According to Douglas, Berryman was arrested in February 2017 on a two-count indictment and waited 1,233 days before going to trial. During this extended period, Berryman had three different judges assigned to his case, was represented by four appointed attorneys, and filed five pro se motions seeking a speedy trial.
The state court proceedings included a hearing on Berryman's speedy trial claim prior to trial. Douglas characterized the state court's approach as "unusual" because it applied the speedy trial analysis separately to each count of Berryman's two-count indictment. This separate analysis led the state court to find a speedy trial violation as to one count but not the other, resulting in dismissal of only one count.
The lengthy delay between arrest and trial raises significant constitutional concerns under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court established in *Barker v. Wingo* (1972) that courts must consider four factors when evaluating speedy trial claims: the length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
A delay of more than three years, as occurred in Berryman's case, would typically trigger presumptive prejudice and require careful scrutiny of the government's justification for the delay. The fact that Berryman repeatedly sought enforcement of his speedy trial rights through multiple pro se motions suggests he consistently asserted this constitutional protection.
The procedural history reveals potential systemic issues in the Mississippi state court system. The assignment of three different judges and four different appointed attorneys to a single case suggests either complex scheduling problems or other administrative difficulties that may have contributed to the extensive delay.
The Fifth Circuit's decision to withdraw its original opinion and substitute a brief affirmation without detailed explanation leaves many questions unanswered about the legal reasoning behind the ruling. Under Circuit Rule 47.6, courts may issue abbreviated opinions in certain circumstances, but this approach provides limited guidance for future cases involving similar speedy trial claims.
Douglas's dissent suggests the panel was divided on how to evaluate the state court's handling of Berryman's speedy trial claim. The "unusual" approach of analyzing each count separately may have allowed the state court to avoid dismissing the entire indictment while still acknowledging some constitutional violation occurred.
The case highlights ongoing challenges in state criminal justice systems where resource constraints, scheduling difficulties, and administrative problems can lead to extended delays that potentially violate defendants' constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the right to speedy trial serves multiple purposes: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
For practitioners handling speedy trial claims, the case demonstrates the importance of consistent advocacy and documentation when asserting these rights. Berryman's multiple pro se motions show his persistent efforts to enforce his constitutional protections despite representation by appointed counsel.
The Fifth Circuit's decision to grant rehearing and withdraw its original opinion suggests the initial ruling may have contained errors or raised concerns among the panel members. However, without access to the withdrawn opinion, it's impossible to determine what legal or factual issues prompted the reconsideration.
The brief nature of the substituted opinion provides no guidance on how federal courts should evaluate state court speedy trial determinations or what deference should be given to unusual analytical approaches like the count-by-count analysis employed here.
This procedural resolution leaves unresolved important questions about speedy trial protections in cases involving multiple charges and the appropriate federal response when state courts employ non-standard analytical frameworks. The lack of detailed reasoning in the substituted opinion may prompt future litigation on similar speedy trial issues in the Fifth Circuit.