The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 23 revived the disability-accommodation lawsuit of a longtime 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund employee, ruling that a federal trial judge applied the wrong legal standard when he threw the claim out before trial. The panel vacated summary judgment for the fund and sent the case back to Manhattan for further proceedings.
Sean R. Raymond Sr. worked for the National Benefit Fund for nearly 30 years, most recently as an Outreach Coordinator who drove to healthcare facilities across Long Island to brief union members on pensions and benefits. During his employment he developed superficial thrombophlebitis, a vein condition that caused life-threatening blood clots and led to multiple hospitalizations, including a 2015 pulmonary embolism. His doctor eventually advised that he avoid sitting or driving for more than 30 minutes at a time.
After Raymond notified the fund of those restrictions, the fund removed the four facilities farthest from his Elmont home from his assigned Area I route. That still left at least nine facilities more than 30 minutes away. Raymond asked to be reassigned to Area J, a more compact zone in Queens and western Long Island that he had previously serviced, but the fund refused. It later told him he could return only with a doctor's note stating he had, in the fund's words, no "restrictions," and it terminated him in February 2019 after he applied for long-term disability leave.
Raymond sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging both that the fund failed to reasonably accommodate his condition and that it fired him because of his disability. The core question for a non-lawyer is whether trimming four stops from a route that still required lengthy drives counts as a genuine accommodation of a medical restriction. U.S. District Judge George B. Daniels granted the fund summary judgment on the accommodation claim in July 2023, finding the fund had "repeatedly accommodated" Raymond and that he had identified no other plausible fix. The discrimination claim went to a jury, which sided with the fund in July 2024.
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Robert D. Sack held that the district court erred by treating any responsive step the employer took as a reasonable accommodation. The ADA demands more, he wrote: "The hallmark of a reasonable accommodation is effectiveness." An action that reduces an employee's workload but does not actually address the person's physical limitations does not satisfy the statute. Because the trial court never analyzed whether removing the four stops enabled Raymond to perform his job given his 30-minute driving limit, it applied an incorrect legal standard.
The panel declined to decide the accommodation question itself, calling it a fact-specific inquiry unsuited to summary judgment. Genuine disputes remain over the extent of Raymond's limitations and whether the modified Area I route still required continuous drives longer than 30 minutes. The court noted a factual conflict between a fellow coordinator's testimony that he could pull over and stretch during drives and Raymond's affidavit stating coordinators were not permitted to take breaks while traveling.
The court also revived Raymond's request to return to Area J as a possible accommodation. Although employers generally need not bump another worker from a filled position, the panel reasoned that a reassignment can be reasonable where it aligns with an employer's own practices. The opinion pointed to evidence that Raymond's supervisor, outreach director Frank Sossi, frequently reassigned coordinators, though the record was unclear whether zones were routinely passed between existing coordinators or only used to fill vacancies. That distinction, the court said, must be resolved on remand, where Raymond bears only a light burden of production.
The Second Circuit reached a different result on Raymond's separate appeal of the denial of his Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial. Citing Ferreira v. City of Binghamton and Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., the panel held that when a trial judge denies a weight-of-the-evidence challenge and leaves a jury verdict in place, that denial is not reviewable on appeal. A losing party's only recourse is to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court dismissed that portion of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Sack acknowledged the rule's "oddness," observing that every other federal circuit appears to permit review of such denials. The panel said it remained bound by circuit precedent absent en banc reconsideration or an intervening Supreme Court decision. Judges Myrna Pérez and Loretta A. Preska, a district judge sitting by designation, joined the opinion.
The ruling returns the accommodation claim to Judge Daniels, who may reopen the summary judgment record or proceed to trial. For Raymond, represented by Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, the decision restores a claim that had been dismissed before it could reach a jury. The fund was represented by Proskauer Rose. The outcome also sharpens Second Circuit law for employers, making clear that partial responses to a worker's medical needs do not automatically satisfy the ADA unless they effectively address the disability.